Less than twenty years ago, a prominent historian remarked on the lack of scholarly attention to the U.S. Right. He attributed the situation to a "problem of historical imagination" stemming from an assumption that progressive, secular modernism undergirded U.S. political life.
The premise of this article is that a series of conceptual templates have circumscribed scholarship on gender and women in the U. S. right and continue to do so today.
5 Not all these templates are explicitly about women or gender, but each has shaped how women and gender issues are studied within the U.S. right. Similar to how Harriet Zuckerman describes the research process in science, in which "scientists define some problems as pertinent, and others as uninteresting or even illegitimate, primarily on the basis of theoretical commitments and other assumption structures," scholars of the right are steered toward some questions and not others by these conceptual templates.
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I begin by presenting two templates that earlier made it difficult for scholars to see women as significant rightist actors or gender issues as central in the U.S. right. These are the template of the rightist as male and the template of Nazi Germany as the prototype of far-right. I then consider three templates that underlie current studies of rightist politics in the U.S. These are the template of historical continuity, the template of belief-driven activism, and the template of gender as a category of analysis. These latter templates have not precluded the study of women and gender on the right, but they have led to problems of focus and interpretation. To illustrate the limitations imposed by these templates, I draw examples from my studies of two major U.S. movements of the right, the 1920s Ku Klux Klan and modern organized racism.
These racist movements were widely separated in time but both enlisted a gender-diverse membership and sought similar goals of white supremacism. Each targeted Jews and African
Americans, yet they differed in other aspects of their ideology and political strategy. The U.S.
did not have substantial fascist movements like those in Europe, Latin American, and Asia, so racist movements are its most prominent manifestation of extreme-right politics.
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The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) of the 1920s was a massive racist movement. Unlike the first KKK of the Reconstruction-era rural South or subsequent Klans from the 1950s and after, the 1920s KKK took deep root in the states of the U.S. North and in urban areas. This second Klan attracted an estimated 3-5 million recruits, who constituted a staggering proportion of the white, native-born, Protestant population that was eligible for membership. Even those who didn't officially join the Klan often supported its efforts, cheering its vast parades down the main streets of cities and towns and electing its candidates to state and local office. Klan chapters across the country had some autonomy to define their enemies and strategies. Although quite elderly by the time they were interviewed, these women were able to provide important recollections about their experience in the Klan that are not available in the documents that survive. Almost all, for example, recounted their time in the Klan in positive terms and were anxious to convince me that being in the Klan was not a particularly extraordinary period in their lives.
Modern organized racism consists of a variety of overlapping and often antagonistic groups of neo-Nazis, white power skinheads, Ku Klux Klans, and assorted white supremacists. My study of modern organized racism focused on the recent incorporation of large proportions of women into racist groups, an effort that partly reflects the desire of male racist leaders to have members who they view as less likely to attract police attention. I conducted extensive life history interviews with a sample of women racist activists who were chosen to represent a variety of types of groups, ages, position in the group, and region of the country. In these interviews, I questioned racist women about the process whereby they learned about organized racism and decided to join, as well as their experiences in the racist movement. I also conducted supplementary interviews with several female and male racist activists to address questions that emerged after the conclusion of the original study. These include the effects of increased federal surveillance of the racist movement and the shift toward a structure of small racist cells on women's participation and experience in organized racism. 
Earlier Templates

The Rightist as Male
When studies of women on the political right began to emerge in the mid-1970s as part of a burgeoning feminist scholarship, 10 they often were heralded as scholarly discoveries that unearthed new facts about women's involvement in the far right. But, for the most part these early feminist scholars did not 'discover' that women had participated in rightist politics in Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, the U.S. New Right, and elsewhere. The 'fact' of women's involvement was not found in a hitherto-unexplored archival collection or through a previously inaccessible racist group. Rather, such facts lay in plain sight, invisible only because they weren't 'seen' as meaningful and significant through templates of scholarly inquiry that marked right-wing politics as the exclusive province of men. Only through a feminist conceptual lens, in which women were central subjects of inquiry, were rightist women made visible. 
Nazi Germany as the Prototype of Rightist Politics
Early studies of racist women in the U.S. took place against a second conceptual template, that the prototypical form of organized racism was WWII-era German Nazism.
Although not specifically about gender, this template also shaped how women and gender were approached in scholarship on the U.S. right. Three implications of the Nazi Germany template were influential in this regard. First, that right-wing extremism grows in an explosive and exponential fashion, as did the Nazi movement in prewar Germany. Second, that far right movements are the product of macro-level and structural crises, especially economic strain or national defeat. Third, that the extreme right gains ascendancy when its authoritarian goals fit the psycho-social structure of the population, as it did in pre-war Germany's rigid and hierarchical family, parenting, and personality styles.
The template of the German Nazi experience as prototypical undercut scholarship on women and gender in the U.S. right because it measured the significance of rightist politics by size. As numerical minorities in racist movements like the 1920s Klan, women were assumed to matter proportionately less; in fact, not at all. Moreover, the propositions that right-wing extremism results from psycho-social factors such as authoritarianism and structural crises like economic collapse or national defeat seemed to underscore its masculinist character: the far-right attracts men who are worried about their eroding power in the family or in the economy and polity. But, these factors made the participation of women on the far right incomprehensible.
White men -who were privileged in economic life, public politics, and the family -had a clear interest in racist appeals to traditionalism, economic stability, and national resurgence. That these men's anger and fear would lead them into the right was understandable, if unfortunate. It was rational and self-interested. Why so many women found right-wing politics appealing in some eras, however, could not be explained. Gender wasn't peripheral to the right in this explanation; indeed, it was paramount. Rightist mobilization was explained by gender, although implicitly. That gender was assumed by the template meant that it did not need to be investigated.
Challenges to Earlier Templates
Over the past two decades, the work of feminist scholars disrupted the earlier templates of studying the Right. The template of the rightist as male could not be sustained as scholars and events in which women were a profound force, from Klan weddings, funerals, and baby christenings to pie-eating contests, community fairs, junior girls' Klans, and Klannish father-son sporting events. Far more than incidental cultural activities, these activities and rituals were a means by which the Klan could insert its racist agenda directly into the daily life of communities.
These allowed white native born Protestants to embrace the Klan as just another facet of expected life in their racially and religious uniform social world; they did not need the assaults of social dislocation or economic frustration to find the Klan's message compelling. Such findings helped shift the search for the foundations of racist mobilization away from the extraordinary forces of social and personal upheaval and toward the ordinary practices of daily life.
Current Templates
By the turn of the twenty-first century, three new templates of inquiry emerged within scholarship on the U.S. right. These accommodated study of rightist women's participation more easily than did earlier templates, but they also introduced new assumptions that continue to curtail a full understanding of how gender matters in the U.S. political right.
Template of historical continuity
The template of historical continuity emerged as a consequence of a shift toward understanding right-wing extremism as a social and political movement rather than an expression of collective anxieties and anger. It developed as part of a general shift away from theorizing all social and political movements as irrational outbursts of collective action and toward understanding them as strategic, organized, and rational collective responses to perceived problems in society. Scholars continued to emphasize the role of personality factors like authoritarianism, rage, and resentment in shaping movements of the right long after these issues ceased to be on the agenda in the study of progressive movements. Yet, by the mid-1990s, most scholarly work on the U.S. right treated it as a social movement that employed rational strategies and tactics to mobilize members, develop its goals and ideologies, and change society.
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The shift toward considering the right as a political movement proved quite productive for scholars. In the case of modern organized racism, it made it possible to understand why so many racist women activists today tend to be well educated and from stable, middle-class families -a far cry from the frustrated, dislocated, or marginal members that earlier templates would predict. Looking at organized racism as a racist movement opened questions of what strategies racist groups use to cultivate women members and revealed that racist recruiters are dispatched to approach women in the ordinary settings of middle-class life -striking up conversations on the playground, at meetings of environmental groups, in grocery stores, and in birthing preparation classes. Women join racist groups, not because they initially are filled with hate and fury toward racial others, but because they come to know and trust someone who they meet in the ordinary course of their lives. Through these contacts, they slowly learn a set of racial beliefs and are eased into the world of organized racism.
However, the move toward thinking of the right as a social movement created an analytic template that proved problematic in the study of gender and women. Seeing the right as a social movement suggested that it was more coherent and continuous than it might be. It made rightist Each Klan also promoted an agenda of white supremacism and, usually, supported violent means to achieve its goals.
Although it is tempting to see these Klans as historical eruptions of an underlying Klan movement, there are such significant differences in the Klan across time periods that it is difficult to term this a single movement. framing it as a continuous political movement, a category of political life. Even in a single era, however, the Klan isn't an entity, despite its efforts to represent itself this way, but rather a collection of similarly-attired but often only vaguely connected and contending groups.
The problem for the study of women and gender on the right is that the template of historical continuity can lead to misleading generalizations about how gender matters without considering specificities of time, place, and context. 19 The effort to indicate how gender and right-wing extremism are related is an example. Asserting a connection between the ideologies or practices of masculine and white supremacism is a highly problematic undertaking if the underlying phenomenon of organized racism is not itself a coherent entity.
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Template of belief-driven activism
Another template is that of belief-driven activism. This is the notion that people come into racist movements because they have racist ideas, or, to put it more abstractly, that racist beliefs cause racist affiliation and action. But is that always the case? Consider an example of a current racist activist, Sean Gaines. 21 Sean was described by one observer as "a skinhead's skinhead: 230 pounds of red-laced, jack-booted aggression, recklessness and bravado, notorious for flashing his gun one minute at white power gatherings, and his penis the next." Raised by a drug-addicted father fond of racial epithets, Sean learned to steal cars and cook methamphetamine at an early age. By 16, he and his father were involved in a vicious torturemurder of a Native American man. Ten years later, now a committed racist skinhead, Sean's spree of violence and mayhem ended with his arrest for capital murder.
At first glance, Sean's biography fits a stereotyped sense of the path into racial extremism: schooled in racist ideas by his father, he turned to violence against racial minorities and became a skinhead. Yet, Sean's story is more complicated. He had an antipathy toward racial minorities, but no particular idea of white supremacy until he hit prison for the first time and met a racist skinhead named Odius. Odius gave Sean the opportunity to earn his first "White Pride" tattoo for attacking a prisoner who owed him money and tried -unsuccessfully -to teach him the tenets of white power. By the time he left prison, Sean still knew little about the ideology behind the white power movement. But he was convinced he was a skinhead and joined other skinheads on "hunting trips" to attack random minorities. It was on these trips, 21 This case is taken from Kathleen Blee, "Trajectories of Action and Belief in U.S. Organized
Racism" in Assaad E. Azzi, Xenia Chryssochoou, Bert Klandermans, and Bernd Simon (eds),
Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary Perspective
(London: Blackwell, 2010), pp. 239-255 .
hanging out with skinheads, that Sean finally learned and adopted the ideology of white supremacy that fit his commitment to racist action.
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Sean's transition from acting like a racist to thinking like a racist is counter to the usual assumption that people develop an ideology and then act on it. But it is not uncommon. Many racists learn white supremacy by participating in racist actions, not the reverse. In the U.S.
today, for example, women racists often learn the virulent ideas of white supremacy as recruiters bring them to racist protests, assaults, and violence. They join in racist activities in the most casual manner, with little reflection on ideas behind the action. Sandy, a skinhead woman I interviewed in 2008, told me that she had always liked to fight, that it made her feel alive and powerful. When she met people in a white power skinhead group, Sandy recalled being instantly attracted to their aggressiveness, the way they talked of smashing their enemies. She joined them in street fights and in violent initiations of new members and soon became a regular.
Only after fighting alongside them for some time did she learn and come to embrace their neoNazi beliefs.
Sean and Sandy's stories do not match the general assumption that people join racist groups because they hate racial minorities. In their cases, actions came first; only later did they learn and adopt the ideologies that then confirmed their racially extreme actions. They were not 
Template of gender as a category of analysis
The final template is that gender always matters. This is evident in the assumption that the motives that bring women and men into racist activism will necessarily differ. Consider the case of 22-year-old Tristian Lynn Frye who was arrested for her part in a 2003 attack and murder of a homeless man in Tacoma, Washington. The attack was carried out by Tristian and three men, among them her boyfriend, with whose child she was pregnant, and the 19-year-old male reputed leader of the local neo-Nazi Volksfront. The four, all known racist skinheads, had set out to assault a Black drug dealer, but instead attacked a man suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
Despite Tristian's statement that she was motivated by a desire to earn a pair of red shoelaces, a Nazi symbol of having taken part in violence against a minority person, and her admission to kicking the homeless man in the head, hard, three or four times, prosecutors considered her to be under the influence of her two male comrades and recommended a reduced sentence. public. They stretch their maternalism or personal loyalties into broader efforts to protect intimate life writ large, on behalf of the white race or the Aryan nation.
The problem is not only that this is a narrow analytic lens on women's racial activism.
Nor that it rests on a public/private dichotomy that legions of feminist historians have worked to undermine. The problem is that by assuming that gender (in this case, a gendered division of public and private) is uniformly important, it undercuts our ability to see how gender can be more or less -or differently -salient across social arenas and in relation to other forms of categorization. In the 1920s, for example, white women were brought into the Klan as newlyenfranchised voters. Today, racist groups also recruit women. But in both cases, that they were women was somewhat beside the point. In the 1920s, white women were newly-enfranchised, thus tempting bait for a Klan hungry for votes for its electoral efforts and dues money for its financial empire. Today, women are targeted for recruitment at least in part because male racist leaders view women as less likely to have criminal records and therefore less vulnerable to becoming informants for, or targets of, the police. In both times, women were brought into organized racism for somewhat non-gendered reasons.
By assuming a priori that gender matters in organized racism, it can be difficult to see the intriguing ways in which it does. Put another way, we may need to rethink the move from asserting that gender matters in organized racism to assuming that gender matters similarly across time and contexts and thereby can be a starting point of analysis. How gender matters in organized racism requires not only that we see gender, but also that we see its limits, its cracks, and its fissures. To know when gender matters requires us to know when it does not.
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Conclusion
How can we move ahead to understand gender on the political right? Certainly, it is not possible to operate without templates. They are the sea in which scholars swim, difficult to perceive or move beyond. But we can push against the constraints of current templates of the First, when is gender most salient, meaningful, and effectual in collective rightist projects and when is it less so? 28 It is no longer sufficient to show that the U.S. far-right is gendered.
Scholars now need to establish the differing levels at which gender matters and how it does so.
Might gender be more salient in rightist movements that arise during periods of broader social Finally, what is the mechanism by which gender matters, or does not? 30 Rightist movements differ in the process whereby they are gendered. Scholars may be able to tease out the specific dynamics of gender on the right by paying close attention to when rightist projects evoke gender, when they depend on gendered ideas and interpersonal relations, and when they might even erode existing ideas and arrangements of gender.
30 Jennifer C. Nash, 'Re-thinking Intersectionality', Feminist Review 89 (2008) , pp. 1-15.
